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Abstract
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will complete its
proceedings over the coming years, leaving behind an enormous collection of records.
The ICTY archive provides a record of conviction and acquittal, prosecution case and
defense response – a vast series of contested facts and arguments. The ICTY winds down
with a decidedly mixed reputation, especially among the communities of the Balkans,
doing damage to the already-discredited idea of a Tribunal capable of aiding the
processes of reconciliation. And yet the UN still speaks of the reconciliatory purposes the
ICTY archives may serve. Pursuing reconciliation, however, sets up the archive for
failure. It would be better for those establishing the archives to focus on other, attainable
goals, taking into account Martha Minow’s caution against judicial records that merely
“speak for themselves” (1998). This essay provides historical context for the
development of the ICTY archives, outlining its two decades of work, and emphasizes
the political context from and into which the archives will emerge.
Keywords: War crimes, Crimes against humanity, genocide, Balkans, Yugoslavia,
Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, international law, international courts, truth and reconciliation.
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Introduction
For nearly two decades, the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY” or “Tribunal”) has adjudicated allegations of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide from the 1990s’ wars in the Balkans. Yet The
Hague-based Tribunal is something more than a war crimes court. It is a repository of
testimony, analysis, judgment, opinion, dissent, contempt, imagery, and memory. Its
archives hold the stories of those who suffered through the siege of Sarajevo, the
massacres around Srebrenica and in Vukovar, the numerous rape camps Bosnian Serb
forces set up around Bosnia in the early 1990s, ethnic cleansing in the Krajina, and much
more. It gives voice not only to the victims but also to the accused, those who, like Serb
President Slobodan Milošević, repeatedly rejected the Tribunal’s authority in lengthy
disquisitions before the bench. The Tribunal stores the assessments of diplomats, military
officers, international analysts, journalists, and others who brought experience and
expertise to the ICTY’s work. In videos and transcripts stored on terabytes of servers,
prosecutors make motions, defense counsel object to them, judges decide them, and a
small army of clerks read evidence into the record that may support or refute them. The
Tribunal may conclude its final cases within the coming years, its record one of legal
progress and deeply contested narratives, but its existence – together with the archives of
the ICTY’s sibling institution, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) – will continue on in an archives of international judicial proceedings.
The Tribunal’s archives, in short, hold the records of convictions and acquittals,
prosecution and defense arguments. The archives are a ‘collection of records that have
been generated in the course of the judicial proceedings’ (Adami 2007). But it is not
merely a record of criminality; it is also a record of innocence, excuse, recrimination,
blame – indeed, much of the emotion that fueled the wars themselves. So how should we
conceptualize the vast archives of the ICTY? What audiences ought it address or take into
account, if it ought to at all? What stories ought it capture? What purposes might it
pursue? How might the legacy of the ICTY fare once its primary work has been
completed? Should we conceive of its work as ‘completed’ when all trials and appeals
have been concluded and all sentences served? Or should it turn to a new phase of work
once the ‘documentation’ phase of trial and judgment has run its course? If its work
continues on, in some form, what is the nature of that work? How should archivists
responsible for the ICTY records treat, appraise, and organize the material?
This essay introduces some of the questions surrounding the disposition of the
ICTY archives. I have limited aims, focusing mainly on introducing the topic and
presenting some ideas for how to address it, given decisions already made. The first
section situates the Tribunal archives in historical, political, and legal contexts and
highlights a critical problem: the ICTY, seen very much as a political actor in the postwar
Balkans, has struggled to assert its identity as a neutral fact-finder and adjudicator of guilt
and innocence. Its shifting images as a partisan (among Serbs and Croats) or a protector
of senior officials (recently, among victims and activists), attacked from multiple angles,
have important consequences for the long-term functions of its archives. The second
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section turns to the nature of the records held by the ICTY and claims for their
disposition. A third section offers several ways to conceptualize the ICTY archives.
Background: A Short History of the ICTY’s Agenda
War came to the Balkans in 1991, as the end of the Cold War uncorked
nationalisms across the region and enabled demagogic politicians – such as Slobodan
Miloševic in Belgrade, Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb, and Radovan Karadzic in
Pale/Sarajevo – to exploit them to maintain and extend their positions of power (Glenny
1996). European powers and the United States found themselves unable to muster the
resources and the will to end the violence, and by the middle of 1992, the war in Bosnia
in particular seemed especially brutal. The UN Security Council set up ‘safe havens’ that
proved unable to provide safety to the victims of the conflict in Bosnia, and otherwise it
did nothing forceful to seek to end the war or its most terrible manifestations. In the face
of its incapacities, the UN instead turned to the idea of justice (Bass 2002; Power 2002).
On May 27, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 827, establishing
the ICTY to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of
genocide that allegedly had taken or were taking place on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. It aimed to highlight the crimes that were coming to light across the region
and to emphasize its condemnation of serious violations of international humanitarian
law. It sought to establish a tribunal that would ‘put an end to such crimes and . . . bring
to justice the persons who are responsible for them,’ and ‘contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace’ (United Nations Security Council 1993). These purposes
resonated with ideas of criminal justice, on the one hand, and the threshold for Council
power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, identification of a threat or breach of peace
and security. The first president of the ICTY, Judge Antonio Cassese, took the purposes a
step further; his words in the Tribunal’s first Annual Report deserve reproduction at some
length:
‘16. The role of the Tribunal cannot be overemphasized. Far from being a vehicle
for revenge, it is a tool for promoting reconciliation and restoring true peace. If
responsibility for the appalling crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia is not
attributed to individuals, then whole ethnic and religious groups will be held
accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal. In other words, "collective
responsibility" - a primitive and archaic concept - will gain the upper hand;
eventually whole groups will be held guilty of massacres, torture, rape, ethnic
cleansing, the wanton destruction of cities and villages. The history of the region
clearly shows that clinging to feelings of "collective responsibility" easily
degenerates into resentment, hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to further
violence and new crimes.
17. Thus the establishment of the Tribunal should undoubtedly be regarded as a
measure designed to promote peace by meting out justice in a manner conducive
to the full establishment of healthy and cooperative relations among the various
national and ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia’ (United Nations 1994).
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Cassese, reflecting a commonly held view in the early days of the ICTY, driven as much
by moral, ethical, and policy commitments as by empirical support, imagined the
Tribunal playing an ambitious role during and after conflict. It would be a tool for
reconciliation, ‘true peace,’ accountability, and international cooperation.
Given the continuing levels of separation and recrimination in Bosnia today, it
would be difficult to argue that the Tribunal met (or even pursued) Cassese’s goals,
reinforcing the sense that broad social or political change cannot and should not be the
goals of international justice. As Martha Minow stated in her influential study of
responses to mass atrocity, ‘Reconciliation is not the goal of criminal trials except in the
most abstract sense’ (1998, p. 26). The same may be said about deterrence, for which the
evidence – at least at the international level – has long been thin (Wippman 1999;
Cronin-Furman 2013). As the reality of criminal trials emerged, as the docket grew, and
as the struggle for cooperation from Belgrade and Zagreb intensified, the Tribunal itself
moved away from the rhetoric of reconciliation and peacemaking in favor of the clear
mandate of criminal trials assigning individual accountability. Bronwyn Leebaw notes,
“The utopian rhetoric that characterized human rights legalism in the 1990s would
eventually give way to a more modest and nuanced set of claims” (2011, p. 55). Mark
Osiel challenged the Cassese position implicitly: ‘A criminal trial . . . is not welldesigned for establishing society-wide consensus over the interpretation of tremendously
controversial acts’ (1999a, p. 248). Osiel’s view had already become the emerging
approach of the Tribunal, avoiding an effort to bring about broad consensus over the
national scope of responsibility and instead focusing on liability case by case. Cassese’s
first annual report of the ICTY recedes as a relic of a particular moment as later reports
highlight the work of the Court and its needs from the UN and its member states. As the
Tribunal’s second president, Judge Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald, noted at the opening of
the 1996 trial of Dusko Tadić, the ‘sole raison d’etre’ of the ICTY was ‘ensuring that this
first trial will be conducted as fairly and as expeditiously as possible with justice being
both done and being seen to be done’ (United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia 1996). This became the ethos of the Tribunal as it indicted
another 160 persons. Examine the succeeding annual reports and one will find a focus on
specific trials, cooperation, enforcement, funding, outreach, and so forth – and very little,
if anything, about peace and reconciliation. (ICTY annual reports are collected at
http://www.icty.org/tabs/14/1.)
And yet, the recognition that even international criminal trials serve one principal
purpose – assigning guilt or innocence to those accused of serious crimes – only thinly
masks the reality that trials, as important as they may be, are an ultimately unsatisfying
way to deal with such massive crimes as genocide and crimes against humanity, crimes
of such scope that individual legal liability shrinks in relation to political, social,
bureaucratic, and moral responsibility. Osiel captures the dilemma when he writes,
‘When it narrows its lens to the person in the dock, the law risks underestimating the
significance of his or her deeds, for their gravity is comprehensible only when seen in
relation to those of many others…’ (2009b, p. 3). The claim that follows is not merely for
some broad historical statement of facts, though UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, as
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recently as 2011, argued that ‘the tribunals’ efforts in gathering and categorizing large
amounts of documentation ensure that history cannot be distorted later for political ends’
(United Nations Secretary General 2011). It is also a claim for ‘the creation of transparent
court records that simply speak the truth to the relevant audiences’ (Minow 1998, p. 125).
Judicial records may ‘speak the truth’ to an audience prepared to receive their messages,
such as those associated with international criminal justice in The Hague, New York,
Geneva and elsewhere. But can they speak to the communities in which the war crimes,
the crimes against humanity, the genocide took place, where the victims and perpetrators
live? Minow doubts that such records have that power on their own: ‘The idea of
accessible court records that speak for themselves . . . is problematic’ (Ibid). Court
records contain a complex mix of substantive, procedural and technical decisions, honest
and prevaricating testimony, objective and biased material, and so forth, such that their
mere existence is hardly enough to tell a truthful story of mass atrocity. The ICTY’s
history highlights that something more than simple accessibility will be needed for its
judgments and evidence to penetrate the dense fog of feeling and perceptions that hangs
over the Balkans nearly twenty years after the wars there ended.
The early trials of the ICTY attended to low- and mid-level participants in
atrocities, mainly in Bosnia and Croatia, highlighting specific crimes such as killings and
rapes, unlawful detention, attacks on civilians, and other categories of war crimes and
crimes against humanity and, ultimately, genocide. One by one, the cases brought out the
narratives of individual victims and perpetrators, as witnesses told often terrible stories
from their experiences in the war. Prosecutors also used the cases to deliver a narrative of
broader responsibility, showing how municipal authorities, military organizations, and
political parties were organized to support and defend activities that amounted to
violations of the law of armed conflict. They brought not just local witnesses to alleged
crimes but also military experts, diplomats, journalists, historians, and others to share
what they saw and know. Defense counsel, validating Osiel’s claim that the Tribunals
would be forums for ‘competing historical accounts,’ developed their clients’ own
counter-narratives (1999a, p. 248). Each case thus became not only a prosecution of a
specific individual or individuals, but a contested history in miniature of the background
behind and broader responsibility for the crimes.
Most of the indictees were Serbs. It was expected that investigations and
prosecutions of lower level perpetrators would lead to, and make it easier to prosecute,
the senior perpetrators. However, they were extremely resource-intensive, and over time,
the Tribunal and the Security Council found it necessary to approach only senior
perpetrators, using different methods. As time went on, therefore, the ICTY focused its
attention on more senior level alleged perpetrators, reaching not only the Bosnian Serb
political leadership (Karadžić, Krajišnik, Plavšić) and military brass (Mladić, Krstić) but
the central leaders in Serbia proper (Milošević, Milutinović, Perišić) and crimes in
Kosovo as well. It brought charges against senior military officials in Croatia (Blaškić,
Gotovina) and Bosnia (Rasim Delić) without seriously disturbing the substantial focus on
crimes against Bosnia’s Muslim community. These senior-level prosecutions should have
been seen as an extension of Justice Robert Jackson’s dictum at Nuremberg that ‘crimes
always are committed only by persons’ (Jackson 1945). Yet the trials of senior-level
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perpetrators heightened the historical and inter-communal contestation, seen most
strikingly in the Milošević prosecution, in which the defendant sought to tell a broad
counter-story of non-Serb responsibility (Boas 2007). The Security Council ultimately
decided that the Tribunal, in order to conclude its operations by a reasonable date, should
focus only on senior officials most responsible for the most serious crimes (United
Nations Security Council 2004).
From the time of its founding, the ICTY has had a difficult relationship with
governments and citizens in the region, especially in Belgrade and Zagreb, while at the
same time engaging the hopes and support of victims of the wars. The focus on senior
officials drove the prosecutions to highlight the broader mechanisms of criminal
behavior, casting blame not upon ‘trigger pullers’ but on the broader policy apparatus that
directed, facilitated, or supported crimes. Attention at the level of government
policymaking drove prosecutors to tell broader ‘historical’ stories, which likely hardened
the attitudes of opposition. The Tribunal enjoyed the strong support of the United States
and European Union, which imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions as long as
Serbia and Croatia failed to cooperate. But the ICTY became a hot political issue in the
domestic politics of the region, and the image of the Tribunal sustained substantial
damage during the years of criticism over Croatia’s and Serbia’s lack of cooperation. A
2009 survey of attitudes toward the Tribunal in Serbia, conducted by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), showed that 72% of those living in Serbia
had a very negative or mostly negative view of the ICTY; among Serbs only, that figure
rose to 78% (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2009). By similar
numbers, the population largely believed that ICTY trials did not contribute to
reconciliation. Attitudes in Croatia at that time, though not subject to the survey, likely
would have shown a similar attitude of opposition, if less pronounced, because of the
investigation and prosecution of those identified as war heroes, such as General Ante
Gotovina (Klarin 2009). The popular Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, at a 2007
commemoration of the 1995 Operation Storm, a central focus of the ICTY’s trial of
Gotovina and others, insisted that ‘no one is going to write Croatian history but us’
(Pavlakovic 2007, p. 1).
Despite the negative attitudes of public opinion in Serbia and Croatia, where
government and politics helped whip up opposition, the attitudes among Bosniaks and
Kosovar Albanians could be counted on for continued support. That base of support,
however, has been shaken by decisions that involve acquittals of key figures in the wars.
The acquittals of Croatian General Ante Gotovina (extremely surprising) and Kosovar
leader Ramush Haradinaj (expected) in the fall of 2012 reinforced the Serb perception of
a biased ICTY, while perhaps providing a modest boost in perception among Kosovar
Albanians and Croats. Then, the acquittals of Momčilo Perišić, former chief of staff of
the Serbian army, in March 2013, and Franko Simatović and Jovica Stanišić, leaders of
the security services in Serbia during the war, in May of 2013, undermined the support
previously provided by victims. All three were widely understood to have played major
roles in Belgrade’s engagement in the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. The Appeals Chamber
in Perišić, however, applied a controversial (if legally supportable) standard to determine
whether the accused aided and abetted war crimes across the border, finding that Perišić
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did not meet that standard. A trial chamber applied the standard to Stanišić and
Simatović, finding that, although the crimes in Bosnia were proven and heinous, it was
not proven that the accused met the standard for aiding and abetting liability. In both
cases, as well as Gotovina, few doubted that the accused played a role in the wars, in all
likelihood a deeply problematic one. But was it a criminal one? The Tribunal found that
the criminal law standard was simply not met.
Right or wrong, that standard and the acquittals generated confusion and anger
among victims and advocates. Consider, for instance, the reaction of Refik Hodzic, a
well-known and respected figure through his independent work in Bosnia and work with
the ICTY and the International Center for Transitional Justice. He tweeted shortly after
the Stanišić and Simatović judgment, “I have no idea what to think about #ICTY
anymore. It has shaken the foundation of my understanding of justice and judicial truth”
(Hodzic 2013). Hodzic’s attitude was widely shared. Nenad Golcevski of the
Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade asserted that the ICTY ‘lost respect’ and ‘lost
credibility, in the region and internationally. We feel as though the rug has been pulled
from beneath us’ (Holligan 2013). The Belgrade-based observer Bogdan Ivanisevic
wondered why ‘the region’s best and brightest are giving up’ on the ICTY, and he named
an impressive list of human rights activists who seemed to have lost hope in the Tribunal
(Ivanisevic 2013). Beyond Belgrade, Ken Roth, the executive director of Human Rights
Watch and one of the leading human rights voices internationally, harshly criticized the
Tribunal, saying it ‘could cripple future efforts to prosecute senior officials responsible
for human rights crimes’ (2013).
The Tribunal’s winding-down should be a moment to celebrate its central role in
reinvigorating international criminal justice, but instead it faces controversy and doubt.
The long-held attitudes of opposition to the Tribunal because of perceived bias,
particularly in Serbia but also Croatia and Bosnian Serb communities, are unlikely to
erode anytime soon. The new attitudes of regret and disappointment, among victims and
organizations that support them or their families, may yet be reversed by further
convictions (such as could result from the ongoing trials of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic). Moreover, given the Tribunal’s collection of vast evidence of criminality and
mass abuse of the rights of civilians during the wars of the 1990s, the traditional
supporters of the ICTY may return to a position of support, to see the ICTY’s legacy as
more beneficial to their goals than they might now think likely. That said, the apparent
legal difficulty of holding Belgrade officials liable for the crimes in Bosnia has
undermined the commitment of many key supporters who saw Serbia’s involvement as
an essential historical component of the crimes in Bosnia. It is easy to see their
disappointment as a representation of an underlying view that the ICTY should not only
adjudicate criminal responsibility but also verify broader narratives about moral and
political responsibility for massive human rights abuses.
The ICTY Records
The United Nations has identified three categories of records held by the
Tribunal: judicial, amounting to all of the material related to investigations, trials,
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appeals, and so forth; non-judicial but generated as part of the judicial process, such as
minutes or results from meetings of the judges; and administrative, such as personnel
records (United Nations 2009). Trudy Huskamp Peterson categorizes the records further,
noting that judicial records should be understood in terms of who created them, especially
the Office of the Prosecutor, Chambers, and Registry offices such as those responsible for
victims and witnesses, legal aid, defense counsel, and outreach (Peterson 2006). The
judicial category alone includes vast amounts of material. In 2009, the UN noted,
‘[The] ICTY has estimated that the total of its physical records by the end of 2010
will require 3,704 shelf metres and that its electronic records will increase by as
much as 8,000 terabytes or more (which will require specific server rooms). The
projected storage needs for paper records for ICTR by 2010 is 2,336 shelf metres,
while the Tribunal has estimated the total amount of digital storage requirements
at 1,020 terabytes by 2010 (which will require specific server rooms)’ (United
Nations 2009, p. 14).
By contrast, consider that the archives of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, at the time considered to be a ‘tremendous amount,’ involved a mere 2500
pages of judgments, 134,765 pages mimeographed, and ten-thousand printed pages
(Kempner 1950, p. 447). The ICTY material includes but is not limited to witness
testimony transcripts and videos, along with supporting documentary evidence; satellite
imagery; signals intercepts; diplomatic correspondence or reporting and other journalism
in digital, video, and written formats; personal artifacts; photographs, videos and so forth
of victims and others from the region; witness and victim interviews, personal data,
documentation; official documents, such as military personnel and logistics records;
minutes of political meetings; indictments prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor and
approved by a panel of judges; judgments of the chambers at the trial and appeal levels;
judicial orders on matters of substance and procedure; transcripts from proceedings;
correspondence between the Tribunal and governments or other information-providers, or
between Tribunal officials and defense counsel, etc.; outreach materials, such as records
of ‘town hall’ discussions in the region, trainings of lawyers and judges, and so forth;
work product, such as notes of investigators, lawyers, and judges, and draft motions,
judgments, and orders; internal guidance, such as policies and rules governing
investigations, prosecutions, conflicts of interest, interaction with witnesses, and much
more.
Many other kinds of documents exist, but this partial list gives an idea of the
breadth of the material and the likely interest to a range of audiences (Emmerson 2011).
This also reflects only the category of judicial records. The administrative records are
also vast, recording basic budgetary issues, personnel, buildings, acquisitions, and other
documents that together tell the story of the growth of the Tribunal.
The public already enjoys access to a vast array of these documents, provided
they are available in documentary form and do not compromise material provided in
confidence (so-called Rule 70 material provided by governments and other entities),
necessary to protect the identities of witnesses or other participants, or otherwise
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privileged or protected as a matter of law. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have opened
much of the public record to access by anyone interested in viewing and using it. It is not
clear how much more is held under rules of confidentiality, but it is likely to be
considerably less than the categories of ‘work product’ or artifacts. The ICTY’s website
includes official and public documents pertaining to each case. It also includes a search
engine to allow access to a huge range of resources, such as evidence, video, and so forth.
ICTY public records number more than 150,000, according to the ICTY, and may be
searched at http://icr.icty.org/default.aspx.
The problem is less identification of the materials than disposition and future use
and functions. For the moment, the archives is an active one that supports ongoing trials
and appeals; the UN considers it also valuable for future work related to those serving
sentences, protection of victims and witnesses, and prosecutions by national authorities
(United Nations 2009). For that reason, the Security Council decided that the Tribunal’s
records will be under the purview of the Residual Mechanism, a transitional body that
will deal with Tribunal business as the Tribunal itself completes its trial and appellate
proceedings (United Nations Security Council 2010). At the same time, however, the
Council asked the Tribunal to work with the countries of the former Yugoslavia and other
interested entities to ‘facilitate the establishment of information and documentation
centres by providing access to copies of public records of the archives’ (Ibid). This hardly
answers the question of disposition, since ‘public records’ addresses only one aspect of
the ICTY archival holdings.
Concepts of an ICTY Archives
The huge quantity of material has triggered an active discussion over the ICTY
archives (Ketelaar 2009; Campbell 2013). The UN’s 2009 report addressing the archives
issues returned to the Cassese model of the role of the Tribunal. Dormant for so long, the
notion of the Tribunal as a tool for reconciliation and peace comes through explicitly.
The report says:
‘It should be recalled that each Tribunal [ICTY and ICTR] was established as a
measure under Chapter VII of the Charter to contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the affected
countries. [reference omitted] The archives are tools for fostering reconciliation
and memory’ (United Nations 2009, p. 55).
This overstates the Security Council’s goal of ‘national reconciliation,’ misstating the
actual language of the early Council resolutions, but it does return the Tribunal to the
vision Cassese expressed. By doing so, the UN suggests a kind of temporal frame around
archival use: either, in the medium-term, the documents will be used by investigators,
prosecutors, and other criminal law professionals (as well as some related to the UN
institutionally), or, in the long-term, the archive will be used for regional and national
‘reconciliation and memory.’ The UN, which highlights its legal ownership of the
archives, puts it this way:
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‘The primary value of the Tribunals’ records will progressively diminish over
time as the residual functions are no longer needed. Thereafter, the secondary
value of the archives, namely, their memory, education and research value, will
progressively prevail. The content of the Tribunals’ archives is significant to
victims, witnesses and their families and, more widely, the populations of the
affected countries. Government officials, other international tribunals and courts,
such as the International Criminal Court, journalists, historians, legal researchers,
political scientists and persons interested in memorializing an event or creating
educational materials, may also seek access to the Tribunals’ records’ (Ibid, p.
15).
The UN’s vision for the archives, though focused on a multiplicity of audiences,
nonetheless fails to articulate the array of purposes that might be served by the archives.
Most importantly, its advocacy for a conciliatory function assumes that the archives itself
contains only uncontested facts, as if adjudicated material must necessarily serve as the
cornerstone of future use. It neglects the fact that the judicial output of the Tribunal, in
particular the judgments at the trial and appellate levels, not only contain adjudicated
facts but also factual and legal interpretation. Kirsten Campbell provides an analysis of
the ideas surrounding the archives as a ‘legal memorial’ (2013, passim). But as noted
above, the adjudications themselves have proven extraordinarily divisive and contested.
Even today, more than twenty years after the establishment of the ICTY, few ‘facts’ are
considered uncontested by people in the region. It may be that, case by case, individuals
may acknowledge the legitimacy of a particular outcome, but the overall narrative of
national and community responsibility remains largely unchanged from where it began,
the wars becoming embedded in national identity (Stover and Weinstein 2004). At this
point in time, it is difficult to imagine the archives developing a ‘reputation’ independent
of the ICTY itself, which means that the archives itself could become a contested
institution filled with contested memories. ‘National reconciliation’ as a purpose of the
archives raises the bar too high. In fact, ‘reconciliation’ is likely to trigger competition for
the appropriate foundational ground on which communities ought to reconcile.
Debates over the archives have, to date, largely focused on the question of
location, assuming that they will have a reconciliation-and-memory purpose. To some
extent the location question has been resolved, at least for publicly available and digitized
records, as national information centers have been identified for individuals to seek
access directly to the archives. The Humanitarian Law Centre in Belgrade, for instance,
already has duplicated significant portions of the archives as ‘a valuable source of
information, which can help in initiating criminal proceedings against perpetrators of war
crimes, triggering social dialogue about the past, and education of young people about the
past’(Humanitarian Law Center 2014). Other centers in Zagreb and Sarajevo will be
making similar records available to their local communities. But the location issue does
not work for all of the documentation, such as artifacts and confidential records.
Moreover, the location debates allow us to avoid the broader questioning of what
purposes the archives might actually serve and the degree of archivist involvement in
appraisal that may be required. For instance, as much as locating the material close to the
communities may provide local actors with direct access to archival materials, multiple
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locations may also advance the cause of competing memories, to the extent that
communities in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Zagreb deploy the archives to tell different
stories that may in fact be at odds with one another – as a judicial archives provides the
material to do just that.
It may be correct to think of the archives as an endlessly useful repository of
documents and artifacts from the work of the ICTY. However, some appraisal may be
essential in order to ensure that the archives serve purposes beyond the ones identified by
the UN. I do not highlight these potential purposes merely to suggest ways in which
audiences may engage the archives. I also want to suggest that archivists, or
policymakers designing specific archival research tools or research facilities, ought to
appraise and organize the records so as to be consistent with the intention of the founding
of the ICTY itself. Thus, purpose-driven appraisal might include the four principal ones
that follow:
An Archives of History and Experience: This is closest to the idea of the archives
as a repository for historical memory, a place that holds truth if we understand truth as ‘a
form of shorthand to denote a series of occurrences, plural by natural, which, while
ultimately unknowable in their entirety, can be partially uncovered’ (Caswell 2010). Tom
Adami and Martha Hunt argue that international tribunal records may serve purposes of
both reconciliation and historical memory (Adami and Hunt 2010). At the community
level, the archives’ collection of video, photographs, and other imagery from the wars in
the Balkans expose individual experiences. Whether they are ‘true’ or served to validate a
prosecution or defense of a particular accused may be beside the point; they reflect lived
experience of the people of the region.
Eric Ketelaar makes a powerful argument for the Tribunal records as providing
the foundation for a ‘living archive,’ capacious enough in spirit and purpose to allow for
challenge and contestation (2009, passim). The archive, in his words, is a ‘space to
escape from a monolithic truth, history and memory, by allowing questioning myth and
rationality – including the myth and rationality contained in the archive’ (Ibid). While the
Balkans bear the scars of splintered memory, a different and often contradictory narrative
propounded by each ethnic group, Ketelaar suggests:
‘The archives of the ICTY, however, cannot be split up according to the ethnic
provenance of perpetrators, victims and witnesses. It is a joint albeit a contentious
heritage that should be accessible from any of the places in former Yugoslavia
(and from anywhere in the world) where people live who want to use the archives.
The contentiousness of the archive might even prove beneficial because it can
show ‘how people can live with continuing disagreements about what exactly
happened in the past and why...’ [citation omitted] . . . I believe that the risk of
contentiousness of the archives should be taken, too’ (Ibid, p. 122).
Ketelaar concludes by arguing that ‘[t]he risk of ‘ethnization’ (or exclusiveness) of
memories may be abated by giving each community in the former Yugoslavia not just a

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2459035

- 12 DRAFT of 17 July 2014
share in a joint heritage, but by making each community a co-custodian of the living
ICTY archives, constantly challenged and challenging’ (Ibid, p. 124).
Ketelaar’s optimistic position in favor of a shared or multiple archives, available
across national and ethnic boundaries, not only has the power of openness and rationality
behind it, but it also has the authority of reality. The ICTY will be making as much of the
records publicly accessible as possible, apart from those subject to individual witness
protection and other legitimate claims to confidentiality, and there is simply no central
figure in the Tribunal or broader UN universe with the authority or power to verify one
particular narrative over another, apart from (perhaps) the final judgments of the
appellate chambers. The documentary material that makes up the judicial records will be
available to be challenged and contested because, as a matter of fact, that is the only
plausible way in which the United Nations might make them available.
And yet it is precisely contestation of fundamental facts – individual
responsibility for atrocities, for instance – that international justice ultimately seeks to
avoid. International justice may focus on the specific criminal behavior of individuals
brought to trial, but the accretion of specific crimes, demonstrating patterns of criminal
behavior, is also designed to constrain the ability to deny the atrocities themselves
(Orentlicher 2008). Contestation will collide directly with this notion of truth-telling, just
as deniers of Nazi atrocities collide with historical truth. Contestation is, however,
unavoidable. Archivists will be under significant pressure, certainly within the UN
system, to adopt the role of arbiter of truthfulness, appraising the ICTY records in such a
way that highlights the conclusions and patterns of criminality as found in judgments of
the chambers. They will be expected by many to construct an archives that speaks for the
records rather than an archives that speaks for itself. Or as Ketelaar himself has
emphasized, archivists, like museum curators, must engage in a process of contextual
reenactment as part of the process of archival construction and appraisal (2001). Whether
they take on such social responsibilities will frame the historical nature of the archives
(Jimerson 2007). Outside a UN archival system, however, archivists and historians in
Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Zagreb will almost certainly be under varying pressures to
construct and narrate in such a way that is consistent with national or local narratives.
The future of the ICTY records thus faces a long-term state of contestation that will
neatly mirror the contestation over the Tribunal’s judicial process itself.
An Archive of Process: The Tribunal, together with the ICTR, invented the
modern law of international criminal procedure and evidence. That law is collected in the
decisions of the Tribunal over time, but the end-point of a decision or order fails to
capture the intricacies of the process, the choices left unmade, the paths not taken, and so
forth. Law on the books appears as if received from on high, but the archives can help
achieve a fuller memorialization of the choices made and the reasons behind them.
On the surface, a process-oriented purpose should provoke lighter recrimination
and contestation than one focused on history and memory. Nonetheless, ‘procedural’
issues have posed significant challenges to the ICTY over time, and they are likely to
persist in the archival phase of the Tribunal. A significant set of process issues will
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appeal to technical experts and legal historians seeking to broaden professional
understanding of the evolution of international criminal process, such as issues pertaining
to the availability of documentary evidence over live testimony, case management,
judicial functions, and so forth. An examination of the range of procedural debates,
however, suggests that process could be subject to similar levels of contestation and will
also require significant efforts of archival appraisal. For instance, due process norms
related to fair trials and the rights of the accused, the length of trials, the equality of arms
between prosecution and defense, the availability of pro se representation (i.e.
representing oneself), the execution of arrest warrants, disclosure of exculpatory and
other kinds of material evidence, and witness protection, to name a few, implicate
significant attitudes toward the ICTY as a whole. Still, a transparent and accessible
archives should bring to life the arguments and advocacy that led to judicial decisions
that have framed much of international procedure today.
An Archives of Jurisprudence: Similar to the process points, the ICTY and ICTR
developed the jurisprudence of international criminal law, a practically unknown and
inert field of law before 1993, captured mainly by the Nuremberg trials, the follow-on
national trials of Nazis, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and a hodge-podge of national
trials over the course of several decades. The Tribunal has produced judgments of
hundreds of pages each, volumes of law that are often difficult to penetrate and explain.
An archives of jurisprudence would capture the nature of that law, the purposes behind it,
the proceedings that led to it, the contestation involved. One could imagine an archives
that is organized around substantive law–war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of
genocide–and takes the audience through each particular criminal prohibition,
highlighting decisions made by prosecutors and defendants in addition to the decisions of
judges. Such an archives could not shrink from the fact that the judicial conclusions
ultimately reflect interpretation of law, thus opening the Tribunal up to a long-term
(perhaps never-ending) process of reconsideration and challenge.
An Archives of an Institution: The ICTY is many things, but it is primarily and
foundationally an institution of the United Nations, a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council, a transmitter of norms, an interpreter of law, a progenitor of contemporary
international criminal law institutions, especially the International Criminal Court. Its
historical records will be subject to national and local contestation, while its procedural
and substantive legal innovations provide the groundwork for the development of a
substantial field of legal study. For these two purposes, the role of the archives will be
indispensible. However, the archives also captures the reality of the ICTY as an
international organization created by the United Nations. Very little literature exists to
capture the lessons learned by those involved in the establishment of the Tribunals,
lessons that will have particular resonance for the UN in future institution-building and
for similar judicial institutions such as the ICC. It would be a great loss indeed if, in the
effort to shape an archives that serves one or more of the above three purposes, the
institutional perspective gets lost, ignored, or devalued.
The archives may serve an institutional-historical function, something available
for reflection by those who think about, design, create, implement, and manage
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international organizations, especially international courts. Even noting this, however,
allows us to reflect on an important point, namely, that the ICTY has essentially created
the records that will constitute the permanent archives. As such, the United Nations holds
a real stake in the future of the archives, not merely as manager or protector of the variety
of privileged material but as a party interested in ensuring that there is broad access to
study the origins and development of the Tribunal.
Conclusion
This essay has sought to provide some background and context for the discussions
concerning the records and archives of the ICTY. In considering the future value and
functions of the archives, I have tried to emphasize that factual and legal adjudication has
not eliminated the element of contestation and protest. Populations in the region,
including or especially their political leaders, either perceive or portray the ICTY as a
partisan actor drawing illegitimate conclusions. At the same time, recent judgments have
sparked outrage among those who typically and historically support the Tribunal.
Opposition will not disappear with the conclusion of the ICTY’s trials and appeals.
Should those developing the archives take such opposition into account? At the very
least, the contested nature of the Tribunal’s present work and future legacy should trigger
some broad thinking about the functions of the archive, beyond the politically constructed
notions of reconciliation. At the same time, to the extent reconciliation remains a desired
purpose, those thinking about the archives should carefully assess how a Tribunal of such
a divisive reputation can, in its archival form, achieve goals unattainable during its
‘primary’ lifetime. It may be possible, with appraisal, to achieve those goals, but they
need to be grounded in a theory of the archives that is faithful to the reality of its difficult
history.
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